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IS SPORT LOSING ITS INTEGRITY?
RICHARD H. MCLAREN*
I. INTRODUCTION: SPORTING INTEGRITY WILL IT SURVIVE?
The integrity of sport is vulnerable to the relentless intrusion by a minority
of individuals who promote or engage in the use of gambling or performance
enhancing drugs (PEDs).
Those individuals are challenging sports
administrators to act in a forceful and meaningful way that has not been the
hallmark of professional sport in these areas to date. Deliberately inept and
unwilling administrators, not wishing to upset the status quo, allow gambling
and drugs to thrive in their sports. At the same time, the cases arising from
gambling and drugs are revealing weaknesses in the dispute resolution
system‟s ability to cope with the legal cases coming forward for adjudication
dealing with corruption. The current arbitration model is, in some respects,
not up to the challenge. The effect of inadequate pursuit of existing regulation
and its lack of administration enforcement, when combined with ineffective
adjudication, are leading to an erosion of sporting integrity.
These forces are gnawing away at the public image and respect of sport
and are the greatest threats to the continuing commercial success of
professional sport.1 The problems languish in the background of sport and
struggle to receive the attention and willingness of sports administrators to
eradicate them. A culture of fame and admiration, combined with profits and
wealth, seems to matter above all else, particularly in professional sport. The
victim of this lack of attentiveness to the erosion of the integrity of sports will
likely eventually claim the jobs of the very persons who ignore these
phenomena. Baseball players are expected to deliver more home runs and
superlative pitching; sprinters and swimmers to shatter world records; cyclists

* Richard H. McLaren is a Professor of Law at Western Law Faculty, UWO, London, Canada.
He acknowledge with thanks the very able assistance of Keri Wallace and Mathew McLeod, both
candidates for the Western Law degree of JD in 2011 and 2012, respectively. Earlier draft versions of
this paper were presented at Istanbul University on September 7, 2010 to the International Sport Law
and Business Conference seminar sponsored by the Istanbul University Faculty of Law Centre of
Comparative Law and the Annual Conference of the National Sports Law Institute of Marquette
Faculty of Law at Marquette University in Milwaukee, Wisconsin on October 22, 2010.
1. GEORGE J. MITCHELL, REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONER OF BASEBALL OF AN INDEPENDENT
INVESTIGATION INTO THE ILLEGAL USE OF STEROIDS AND OTHER PERFORMANCE ENHANCING
SUBSTANCES BY PLAYERS IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 11–15 (2007) [hereinafter MITCHELL
REPORT].
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to climb every mountain faster. These expectations give rise to the
impressions in athletes that their natural abilities are not enough; PEDs
become part of the solution by which expectations are realized. Sports
administrators, like ostriches burying their heads in the sand, do not want to
know how all these athletic achievements are being accomplished. Gambling
has a similar insidious effect on athletes and the integrity of sport and reflects
an evolution akin to that for PEDs.2
Private-sector and government-run gambling websites send a message to
the public at large that betting is acceptable. Not only do government Internet
gambling websites make it seem morally acceptable to bet, they may also
attract citizens who may not have otherwise gambled. The growing avalanche
in betting is resulting in unforeseen attempts at corrupting athletes to increase
profits. It must be recognized, however, that what athletes do in respect to
gambling is, like drugs, a microcosmic reflection of the larger society in which
we all live. The problem for sport is that, as the moral standards of the past
hold less sway than a generation ago, this erosion of standards is negatively
affecting the integrity of sport when athletes and others connected to sport
gamble on their sport. This leads to temptation to fix sporting results or
corrupt interim stages of a sporting event to enhance the gambling profits.
The manner in which gambling is being dealt with by sport reflects a parallel
process to that which has been going on with the use of PEDs. PEDs are used
by athletes despite the risks that such substances are not only physically
dangerous to the athlete but also have ripple effects for the athletes‟ lives and
work beyond sport. PEDs cause youth to see corruption as necessary to
succeed. Fans lose faith in the authenticity of results.3 Those athletes who
gamble are dissatisfied with the financial rewards of their chosen activity and
look to augment their income. Different forces drive the athlete to be corrupt,
but the effects of PEDs or gambling are similar on the integrity of sport.
Those individuals associated with gambling and the delivery of drugs for use
by athletes are often linked to larger units of organized crime,4 thus putting the
athlete in harm‟s way, perhaps unintentionally. Thus, there is an increasing
need to regulate corruption, keep sporting events clean, and restore and build

2. See It’s Just Not Cricket: Sport of Gentlemen Rocked by Fixing Allegations,
THEWESTERNSTAR.COM, Aug. 29, 2010, http://www.thewesternstar.com/Canada---World/Sports/
2010-08-29/article-1707495/Its-just-not-cricket%3A-Sport-of-gentlemen-rocked-by-fixingallegations-/1.
3. The Mitchell Report on the use of PEDs in Major League Baseball notes that the use of drugs
causes fans to question baseball records and encourages youth to use PEDs. MITCHELL REPORT,
supra note 1, at 11–17. The health risks involved in PEDs have more serious effects on adolescents.
Id. at 4–17.
4. See ADAM LEWIS & JONATHAN TAYLOR, SPORT: LAW AND PRACTICE 843–44 (2008).
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public confidence in professional and elite sport.
International sporting federations and government programs, with the
leadership of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), have begun a
commendable job of regulating the drugs area. In WADA‟s short history,
fashioning a single international doping regime that effectively harmonizes the
rules of sporting federations to govern the use of PEDs is a laser light beacon
of significant accomplishment. In the last five years, integrity units have been
established in many professional sporting associations and, to a far lesser
extent, in nonprofessional international sports federations to investigate and
eradicate corruption in the sport.
Still, there are challenges when
administering these regimes. One reason these difficulties arise is that the
regulatory agencies and participating sporting federations are
nongovernmental organizations and are part of a private system that very
jealously guards control over its affairs and activities.5 Such organizations
lack the power to compel non-athletes to comply with the rules. They also
have limited authority to collect information other than blood and urine
samples from athletes during in-competition and out-of-competition testing.
Thus, to be effective, at times, the private system needs significant assistance
from the public authorities to pursue corrupt individuals. The coming
challenge is to knit the approach of both sets of authority together without
taking away the control of sport by sport officials and their accompanying
federations.
II. THE GROWTH OF PERFORMANCE ENHANCING DRUGS
Some skeptics argue that doping has always formed a part of sports and,
therefore, anti-doping regimes can never eliminate the use of drugs in sport.
One commentator even refers to anti-doping efforts as “a denial of the reality
of contemporary sport.”6 It is believed that doping in sport can be dated back
as far as Ancient Greece.7 But, a history of usage does not compel acceptance.
Doping regimes are mainly the responsibility of national sporting federations
operating under the regulations of their respective International Federations
(IFs). National federations must also comply with the rules of their National
Anti-Doping Organizations (NADO) and frequently delegate their
responsibilities in respect of PEDs to those bodies. WADA harmonized the
5. Indeed, many IFs establish their operating legal entity in Switzerland as a Swiss Association
so as to have the benefit of the principle of association autonym at the heart of the Swiss law on
associations.
6. Ellis Cashmore, Doping Scandal: Stop Testing and Legalize All Drugs, in WRITING
ARGUMENTS: A RHETORIC WITH READINGS 641 (John D. Ramage et al. Eds., 7th ed. 2007).
7. LEWIS & TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 843.
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international standards for doping by developing the WADA Code (the Code).
However, the best rules on the planet still require rigorous and effective
administration to have the desired effect and fundamentally depend upon
education for deterrence. The Code effectively harmonizes and synchronizes
rules between sporting federations that are signatories8 when the provisions
are mandatory, but problems in administration arise when provisions are
permissive,9 and the whereabouts rules are under attack, mainly from
professional sport. When the rules are drafted to incorporate NADOs,
problems still arise, as a regime on paper is useless without proper
enforcement. No one will care about the rules if chances are slim that they
will ever apply. To be an effective deterrent, a reasonable portion of athletes
must be tested in and out of competition, and the sanctions must be
meaningful. However, this said, one should never lose sight of the real
deterrent. Education of athletes is ultimately the most effective deterrent,
backed up by a rigorous doping regime and legal sanctioning.
It is not the Code that causes the problems but rather the unwillingness of
the sports administrator to attend to the vigorous enforcement of the regime.10
Marquee athletes increase ticket sales and draw attention to the sport. The
short-term effects of poor administration are higher earnings and a bigger fan
base. These officials ignore the fact that doping is a major health risk to the
athlete and that doping discourages parents to put their youngsters in sports,
fearing their child will face the allure of PEDs.11 As these longer-term effects
surface, the integrity of the sport diminishes; repairing this damage will be a
very difficult and long process. The other side of the coin is the effective
prosecution of those cases that do arise under the Code. The Court of
Arbitration for Sport (CAS) is designated as the final appeal body for issues
arising out of the Code. However, the arbitration system used by virtually all

8. As of 2004, all IFs with events in the Olympic Games must be a signatory to the WADA
Code.
9. LEWIS & TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 894. Conflicting rules between NADOs and IFs create
difficulties for the national federations that wish to be compliant with both anti-doping rules.
Permissive provisions include testing requirements, sample analysis, results management, and
education and research.
10. In March 2010, a steroid scandal at the University of Waterloo in Canada revealed nine
players on the university‟s football team either tested positive or were being investigated for the use
of PEDs. After subsequently performing tests throughout universities, the Canadian Interuniversity
Sport (CIS) announced a crackdown on the regulation of PEDs, including a reallocation of testing,
increasing the amount of football players tested from 5% of football players in Canada. CIS admits
that the previous level of testing was not a strong deterrent. Frank Applevard, CIS Announces New
Football Drug Testing Strategy, CANADIAN UNIVERSITY PRESS, http://newswire.cup.ca/articles/
31872 (last updated Aug. 12, 2010).
11. MITCHELL REPORT, supra note 1, at 15–17.
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sports and administered at the elite level by CAS is not always able to
effectively address some of the difficulties associated with adjudication of
such disputes.
The increase in doping cases is not necessarily due solely to an increase in
usage of PEDs but is in part a result of advancing testing abilities that detect
smaller and smaller amounts of drugs in an athlete‟s system. Tennis player
Richard Gasquet12 became aware of how meticulous and precise the tests can
be after his urine sample, given at an Association of Tennis Professionals
(ATP) tournament in Miami in 2009, revealed the presence of cocaine
metabolite benzoylegonine. The amount was so minute that the International
Tennis Federation (ITF) Doping Tribunal, after hearing expert testimony,13
found this likely reflected accidental ingestion from kissing a female who had
used cocaine and was not reflective of a cocaine user. The fact that the tests
are extremely precise only helps identify the presence of a banned substance.
As Gasquet demonstrates, CAS14 is not unreasonable in its application of the
rules and recognizes that, where an amount is so minuscule, there is a
possibility of accidental usage, and CAS is open to hearing expert evidence to
prove ingestion was without fault or negligence. However, not every athlete
has the financial wherewithal to mount such a challenge and achieve,
essentially, exoneration.
Along with this history of usage is a code of silence that remains strong in
the doping community.15 The earliest sign of its intractability was revealed
12. See Decision in the Case of M. Richard Gasquet (Int‟l Tennis Fed‟n Indep. Anti-Doping Trib.
July 15 2009), http://www.itftennis.com/antidoping/news/decisions.asp (first instance decision).
13. The “A” sample contained a trace amount of pure cocaine, which the expert testimony
revealed can be excreted from the body only in the first twelve hours after ingestion. For this and
other reasons, the science tended to corroborate the story of the athlete. Id. at 25–26.
14. Both the ITF and WADA did not accept the stretching of the Doping Code that took place in
the first instance case, and they appealed to CAS. See Int’l. Tennis Fed’n. / Gasquet, CAS
2009/A/1926, WADA / ITF & Gasquet, CAS 2009/A/1930 [hereinafter Gasquet]. The CAS accepted
the wisdom of the first instance approach and upheld the decision but did so by stretching the WADA
Code rule on “No Fault,” something the first instance panel refused to do to arrive at a just result.
Moreover, in so doing, they destroyed the balance of the first instance case in that it was carefully
constructed so that the incident was a first doping offense. The CAS, in stretching the WADA Code
to fit the facts into the “No Fault” test, had the unsatisfactory result that, should there ever be a future
positive analytical case with this athlete, it will be in effect a first instance case, being the net effect of
the provisions dealing with second offenses. It is submitted that this is an undesirable consequence of
the approach taken. For a case somewhat akin to this problem when you have a second offense, see
the appeal case in IAAF / USADA & Gatlin CAS 2008/A/1462 & Gatlin / IAAF CAS 2008/A/1461.
15. The perjury charges against professional baseball player Roger Clements will likely make
some athletes decide that the code of silence is not all that beneficial to them, particularly when they
are required to explain themselves and of necessity get caught up in a web of deceit. Clemens was
indicted on federal charges for lying while under oath at a hearing before a House Committee of the
US Congress about his use of PEDs. Clemens‟ allegedly false testimony obstructed the congressional
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with Canadian sprinter Ben Johnson‟s comments before a judicial inquiry. His
confession did not prompt any other athletes to come forward. The rather
inept protestations of Roger Clemens to the contrary also provide a bookmark
to the code of “deny, deny, deny” and the ring of silence as a defense. There
have been few whistle-blowers among those caught doping. Of recent date,
the most notable is the American cyclist Floyd Landis,16 whose allegations
exposed the use of PEDs by himself and his team and made allegations against
a wide range of professional cyclists, including one-time teammate Lance
Armstrong. Landis‟s information came two years after CAS upheld his
suspension.17 Beyond the problems of punishing individuals whose doping is
uncovered in this manner, discussed later in this paper, such confessions and
related whistle-blowing are rare and cannot be relied upon to reduce, let alone
eliminate, the use of doping in sports. They do point out the fact that sports
administrators are not vigilant and effective in administering the doping
regimes under their management control. Both the Landis and Gasquet cases
also reveal the challenges to the use of arbitration to resolve doping disputes.
The original defense is alleged to have cost Landis more than $2,000,000
USD18 and cost Gasquet some £500,000 ($750,000 USD), and the appeals
were done de novo at further expense. Professional athletes may be able to
incur such costs, but most IFs and NADOs are not capable of bearing such
inquiry. If he is convicted on all charges, Clemens could face up to thirty years in prison. Roger
Clemens Perjury?: Pitcher Indicted on Federal Charges, HUFFINGTON POST.COM, Aug. 19, 2010,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/08/19/roger-clemens-perjury-pit_n_687804.html.
For an
interesting snapshot of the implications upon one‟s life that lying to federal authorities can have, see
MARION JONES, ON THE RIGHT TRACK: FROM OLYMPIC DOWNFALL TO FINDING FORGIVENESS AND
THE STRENGTH TO OVERCOME AND SUCCEED (2010).
16. Marion Jones confessed to her failings as an athlete while not implicating others. See
generally JONES, supra note 15. Her confessions did not alter results of the USA relay team at the
Sydney Olympics. See Anderson, Clark, Miles-Clark, Edwards, Gaines, Hennagan, & Richardson /
IOC, CAS 2008/A/1545. This was initially the situation for the men‟s US relay, where team member
Jerome Young‟s drug use and ineligibility at the 2000 Games resulted in the team losing their medals,
which CAS reinstated. See USOC / IOC & IAAF CAS 2004/A/725. But in 2008, after team member
Antonio Pettigrew confessed to using PEDs at a trial against team coach Trevor Graham, the athletes
were once again stripped of their medals. Juliet Macur, I.O.C. Strips Gold From 2000 U.S. Relay
Team, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2008, at SP7. Despite infamous usage of PEDs over at least five seasons,
American baseball player Barry Bonds is still being considered as a possible Hall of Fame member
for 2013, as the election requirements are silent on the use of PEDs. Future Eligibles, NATIONAL
BASEBALL HALL OF FAME, http://baseballhall.org/hall-famers/rules-election/future-eligibles (last
visited Mar. 11, 2011).
17. See United States Anti-Doping Agency v. Landis, Case No. 30 190 00847 06 (Sept. 20,
2007), available at http://www.usantidoping.org/files/active/arbitration_rulings/landis%20final%
20(20-09-07)%20(3).pdf. The decision was appealed to CAS. See Landis / USADA, CAS
2007/A/1394.
18. Juliet Macur, Landis’s Positive Doping Test Upheld, N.Y.TIMES.COM, Sept. 21, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/21/sports/sportsspecial1/21landis.html?ref=floyd_landis.
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costs in prosecuting a case at first instance and then having to redo the case
again on appeal.
III. THE NEED TO REGULATE THE USE OF PEDS
Clean athletes want a level playing field when competing, which translates
into a desire to eradicate doping in their sport that is not always shared by the
sport administrator despite protestations to the contrary. Although it is certain
PED usage is more prominent than the current number of cases or analytical
positives from the laboratories reveal, it remains a fact that use is by a
minority of athletes. The sports administrator who is lax in the administration
of the sport‟s doping regime is not looked upon with admiration by the athletes
and will increasingly experience the scorn of the public. Athletes want fair
results and, therefore, want to ensure a drug-free playing field. Winning
athletes who do not dope want their results to be worthy of admiration, not
skepticism and innuendo. The suspicion that now enshrouds every dramatic
sports result is an indication of the loss of integrity for sport. That loss of
integrity damages the reputation of both dopers and clean athletes19 and sullies
the image of sport. Doping scandals in international sport have received
significant media attention that is eroding the perception of sport.20 A strict
doping regime that is properly adhered to and administered will work to
remove the stigma from sports that have been previously tainted by doping
scandals. Unless authorities vigilantly monitor doping by the few bad apples,
public perception will be that professional sport is overrun with dopers.
The “Spirit of Sport” is explicitly part of the Code. This term was
developed as a way to further justify regulation of doping in sport. Arguments
that refer to protecting the Spirit of Sport are arguments about protecting
integrity and honor and rewarding natural abilities, sound training, and hard
work. Cheating destroys these values. Rather than develop a moral argument
as a reason to regulate corruption, this allows doping violations to be
19. See DANIEL M. ROSEN, DOPE: A HISTORY OF PERFORMANCE ENHANCEMENT IN SPORTS
FROM THE NINETEENTH CENTURY TO TODAY 116 (2008). In a chapter entitled “Is Everyone
Doping?,” Rosen claims the increase in frequency of drug use, the confession of those athletes who
previously denied allegations, and the spread of doping in almost every sport puts a strain on fans
belief in athletes. Public skepticism and media attention dates back to the early 1980s, with Peter
Lawson of Manchester Guardians famously saying, “Unless something is done soon, international
sport will be a competition between circus freaks manipulated by international chemists.” FRED C.
PAMPEL, DRUGS AND SPORTS 4 (2007).
20. In cycling, the American team and the Spanish team have had to deal with cases from
WADA. Athletics has had an image of doping since Ben Johnson, and it remains with scandals
continuing up to the 2000 Games with Marion Jones and the men‟s relay team. The backlash of this
press is that Jamaican runner Usian Bolt and swimming hero Michael Phelps are constantly
confronted with malicious speculative allegations of doping.
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justifiably pursued without starting a debate over whether officials should be
regulating moral and ethical issues. Although the values that are encompassed
in the Spirit of Sport are often linked to morality, protecting them is not a
moral issue. All sports embody this spirit; therefore, to keep competition
operating on a level, drug-free playing field, the Spirit of Sport must be
upheld.
Regulation of sport is also justified by viewing doping as fraud.
Professional sporting events have a large amount of prize money.21 Players‟
high rankings lead to an increase in popularity and marketability. As a result,
more than prize money is up for grabs, as sponsorship, athlete endorsement
contracts, and ad campaigns are also at stake. Cheating to obtain these results
is comparable to other economic crimes, such as insider trading in the
financial world, and many believe those who cheat ought to be prosecuted just
the same.22
IV. INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATIONS
After shot-putter C.J. Hunter was sighted at the 2000 Sydney Games,
seemingly with athlete accreditation despite being banned from the sport for
doping, the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) filed a
complaint against the national federation, USA Track and Field (USATF), for
withholding information about testing. An independent international inquiry
report revealed that the USATF did not conceal any of Hunter‟s tests, but the
report did reveal that USATF did not always follow procedures and was slow
to report positive findings. This included noncompliance with its regulations
and deadlines for testing, as well as failure to provide proper whereabouts
information to the IAAF.23
The lack of enforcement is prominent in professional sports. A U.S.
Congressional Committee held hearings to examine the use of anabolic
21. PGA tournament purses range from $3,000,000 to $8,000,000, with first place at the U.S.
Open winning $1,350,000. Tennis also has large amounts of prize money, with the purse at the four
Grand Slam tournaments being in excess $9,000,000, each, the winners each earning over $1,100,000.
22. In Meca-Medina v. Commission of European Communities, the European Court of Justice
vacated the CAS award on the basis that it had economic implications because the swimmers were
banned from participating in their profession; any attempt to separate sport from employment was
artificial. See generally Case C-519/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-06991. Emeritus WADA President Dick
Pound believes dopers should be suspended from “work” even where doping is characterized as an
economic issue, stating, “You have a right to work, but if you‟re cheating you do not have the right to
work as a cyclist. It is an economic crime as well as a sports crime.” Dick Pound interview with
Velonews. Interview by Charles Pelkey, VeloNews, with Dick Pound, President, World Anti-Doping
Agency (Dec. 24, 2004), available at http://velonews.competitor.com/2004/12/news/velonewsinterview-wadas-dick-pound-2_7332.
23. See BARRIE HOULIHAN, DYING TO WIN 174-76 (2002).
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steroids and human growth hormones by players in Major League Baseball
(MLB). A follow-up investigation began after the revelations and controversy
arose from the sports nutrition center Bay Area Laboratory Co-operative
(BALCO). The Mitchell Report is a lengthy document detailing PED usage in
MLB and was meant to be the beginning of the end of the “steroid era” and
close the door on that period of baseball history. The Mitchell Report
confirmed that PEDs are a major threat to the game, revealing eighty-nine
players connected to doping by using informant testimony and other
supporting documents. The Mitchell Report prompted some reaction from
MLB, but it may not have been enough. Most of the recommendations were at
least given the appearance of having been adopted. The creation of the report
was a late reaction to a problem MLB was aware of before the independent
report. MLB had many sports administrators, referred to earlier, who were
willing to turn a blind eye to what was going on. Although an independent
report can expose PED usage and provide recommendations for an effective
doping program, it is only a waypoint to solving the problem. Such reports are
expensive; IFs and national federations do not have the resources to perform
such investigations. Baseball officials‟ benign approach24 let the problem of
steroids in the sport thrive until an independent investigation was necessary
and unavoidable if the American Congress was to keep from legislating a
change that would have caused baseball to lose control of its sport in this
dimension.
V. GROWTH OF GAMBLING25
Gambling has gone through a period of accelerating growth and
acceptance in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Gambling is at the
heart of cultural norms that are inconsistent throughout the world. Some
cultures forbade it, others frowned upon it but to a degree tolerated it, and
other cultures assumed it would go on and had no interest in forbidding it. In
the past, repercussions for gambling were very serious, with the possibility of
imprisonment for certain gambling-related offenses. The excitement and
financial rewards that gambling presents and offers are at the root of its
popularity; however, they are also the root of the negative consequences of
24. The report uncovered that, in 2004, during the federal BALCO investigation, the Major
League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) and the Commissioner‟s Office had suspended
testing for part of the season and those players involved in the federal investigation may have been
warned of upcoming tests. The MLBPA justified this notification as a matter of protecting
confidentiality and integrity. MITCHELL REPORT, supra note 1, at 24–28.
25. Some of the ideas and data for this section of the paper came from an unpublished writing
credit done by a researcher of mine and student in my Law and Sport class. I am indebted to Ryan
Abrahamson, Western JD 2012, for his assistance and input in this segment of the paper.
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gambling for sport and its integrity. Although affluent people were the major
participants in gambling, there were strong links to both loose morals and
organized crime. Gambling had a sleazy reputation. Today, there appears to
be a strong connection between sports wagering and corruption in sport.
The global acceptance of gambling, exemplified by the number of
government-run gambling operations, further corroborates this gambling
evolution and avalanche of betting. The Province of Ontario, Canada, will
controversially start offering online gambling in 2012, provided by the
provincial government-owned Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation, with
the main published motivation being the lucrative profits available.26 In
Canada, net gambling revenues totaled $11.8 billion in 2003.27 It is estimated
that gambling in the United States reached almost $73 billion dollars in
2004.28 By 2009, there was $2.57 billion legally bet on sports in the state of
Nevada alone, and Americans illegally bet approximately $380 billion in
total.29 In 2007, nearly half of America‟s population and over two-thirds of
Britain‟s participated in some form of gambling. A UK gambling commission
report determined that the UK gambling market was £84 billion in 2006–07.30
A recent study by Foreign Policy estimated that the entire Asian gambling
industry, both legal and illegal, is $450 billion USD per year.31 In 2009, Las
Vegas “raked in gambling revenues of $10.4 billion and Macau $14.7
billion.”32 Recent trends show that gambling is gaining further acceptance and
becoming even more mainstream. Although there are some protests to the
Ontario government‟s recent acceptance and management of online gaming,33
26. Naomi Parness, OLG to Bring Online Gambling to Ontario in 2012, CTVNEWS.COM, Aug.
12, 2010, http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/Canada/20100810/ontario-online-gambling-duncan-100810/.
27. History of Gambling, PROBLEMGAMBLING.CA, http://www.problemgambling.ca/EN/About
GamblingandProblemGambling/Pages/HistoryOfGambling.aspx (last visited Aug. 11, 2010).
28. Id.
29. Sports Wagering, AMERICAN GAMING ASSOCIATION, Sept. 8, 2010, http://www.american
gaming.org/Industry/factsheets/issues_detail.cfv?id=16. Sports gambling is regulated through state
and federal legislation and is legal in the state of Nevada as well as in Delaware, Montana, and
Oregon Of the four states, only casinos in Nevada maintain sports books enabling wagering on a
single sporting match.
30. UK GAMBLING COMMISSION, INDUSTRY STATISTICS 2008–2009 3 (2009), available at
http://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/pdf/industry%20statistics%202008-2009%20%20August%202009.pdf.pdf.
31. DECLAN HILL, THE FIX: SOCCER AND ORGANIZED CRIME 55 (2008).
32. John Fasman, Shuffle Up and Deal, THE ECONOMIST, July 8, 2010, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/16507670.
33. Section 202 of the Criminal Code of Canada makes it an offense to record or register bets,
book-make, or sell a pool. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C–46, § 202 (1985). However, there
is not an outright ban of wagering in sport because section 207(1)(a) of the Criminal Code allows a
provincial government to run a lottery scheme. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C–46, § 207(1)(a)
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the overriding opinion is that, in tough economic times, taxing gambling can
help turn around a struggling economy.34 This growth of government
gambling sites that compete with offshore operations means that the push by a
few to corrupt athletes and officials will increase and the connection between
sports wagering and corruption will expand. If sports administrators bring the
same less-than-vigilant attitude and approach to regulation of gambling and
sports betting as they have shown towards doping issues, there will be
considerable effects on the integrity of sport.
VI. THE NEED TO REGULATE GAMBLING
Gambling on sporting events can take several different forms. A punter
can choose to place a bet on a betting exchange platform or through a
“bookie.” The sports betting platform operator takes no risks and merely
allows the prospective punter, through the exchange, to find another person
with whom to make a bet. In contrast, the bookie takes on a risk with the
punter. Bookies typically have limits on the amount of any single bet in order
to ensure their own solvency.35 The bookie industry, where it is legally
allowed, is regulated and does not generally cause a problem for sport.36 It is
the illegal bookie, frequently contacted through the Internet, who poses the
(1985). Section 207(4) defines a lottery scheme. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C–46, § 207(4)
(1985). The wording of the legislation has led the provincial government in Ontario and British
Columbia and the maritime provinces through Atlantic Lottery Corporation to opiate sports gamming
programs that involve betting on more than one sporting event.
34. In the United States, the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 (the
PASPA) makes sports gambling illegal across the USA. 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3704 (2011). The four
states of Delaware, Montana, Nevada, and Oregon are grandfathered in the legislation because they
operated sports wagering schemes before the legislation was enacted. Oregon and Delaware are
permitted to run a sports lottery, and Montana is permitted to run sports pool betting. Delaware
attempted to expand its sports wagering on individual sporting events but lost in a ruling by the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Office of the Comm‟r of Baseball v. Markell, 579 F.3d 293 (3d Cir.
2009).
35. One of the complaints of the regulated bookies is that the betting platforms tend not to have
limits on the size of bets because they are merely a facilitator finding both sides of the bet. Thus,
these platforms can be the source of money laundering and other corrupt activities.
36. Despite that fact, the IOC has prohibited the London Olympic Games Organizing Committee
(LOGOC) from having any sponsorship agreement with any potential gambling sponsor. IOC
Director of Legal Affairs, Howard Stupp made this statement at the C5 European Sports Law and
Business 2010 Conference held in Geneva, Switzerland, on October 19 and 20. This feature
demonstrates the level of caution that the IOC has engaged in when dealing with betting associated
with the Games. At the Olympic Games in Beijing in 2008, the IOC had used the Early Warning
System of FIFA to monitor gaming activity and then progressed in 2010 to the use of its own in-house
monitoring system for the Winter Olympics in Vancouver. Pâquerette Girard Zappelli, Secretary,
IOC Ethics Commission, Presentation at the C5 European Sports Law and Business 2010 Conference
(Oct. 19–20, 2010); see generally Conference Proceedings, C5-ONLINE.COM (UK), http://www.c5online.com/conference_proceedings.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2011).
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threat to sport. The market for wagering on sport events in the United States is
$380 billion bet illegally, compared to the legal market of $2.57 billion.37 The
profitability of the activity has attracted global operators and, with them,
organized crime. In response to the popularity of online gambling, the United
States passed the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 200638
(UIGEA). That legislation does not make it illegal to place a wager online but
prohibits anyone engaged in the business of betting to accept funds in the form
of credit, electronic fund transfer, check, or any form of financial transaction
in relation to unlawful Internet gambling.39 This legislation did lead to the
downfall of Tradesports.com, which ceased operation in November 2008, but
the fight against online sports gambling is far from won.
Illegal bookies often have access to athletes through a variety of ways.
For instance, Australian cricket stars Shane Watson and Brad Haddin were
approached by a suspected Indian gangster with ties to illegal bookmakers in
2009. Australian captain Ricky Ponting stated
We‟ve had instances in the past couple of years where blokes
have come up to players in bars and wanted to talk about what
is happening, and strange phone calls going through to the
(hotel) rooms . . . We know what to do and we do it. We let
the team manager know straight away and the ICC
[International Cricket Council] is informed from there. You
have to be so careful with everything you do now, everyone
you meet, everywhere you go.40
Many illegal bookies in the cricket world are based in India and have also
been causing issues for the legal bookmakers. In the overtly corrupt world of
gambling on cricket, there have been issues with illegal bookies that have
caused legal bookmakers to take action. Aamir Sohail, the former captain of
the Pakistan cricket team, has stated that illegal bookies are able to influence
matches as they are unencumbered by the taxes and sponsorship obligations
that legal bookmakers are faced with.41 “Aamir is convinced that „legal‟
bookmakers like Ladbrokes, William Hill, and Bet Fair got sick and tired of
37. Sports Wagering, supra note 29.
38. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361–5367 (2011).
39. § 5363.
40. Aussie Stars Targetted by Illegal Bookies: Report, THE TIMES OF INDIA, Aug. 31, 2010,
available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/sports/cricket/top-stories/Aussie-stars-targeted-byillegal-bookies-Report/articleshow/6466043.cms.
41. Khalid Hussain, It’s a Battle Between Illegal and Legal Bookies: Aamir Sohail,
ARABNEWS.COM, Sept. 24, 2010, http://arabnews.com/sports/article145314.ece.
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the fact that illegal bookies were [enjoying the majority of] worldwide
gambling profits and nobody was doing anything about it.”42 He stated,
“„Legal bookmakers must have been losing millions of pounds each year
because of manipulation of the illegal bookmakers.‟”43 Many involved with
sport place the blame squarely on illegal bookies and their network. Sporting
associations integrity units and anti-corruption units have been greatly
ineffective against the illegal bookies; however, with the added attention of the
legal bookmakers, the international sporting community is beginning to
understand the extent of the issues caused by the illegal bookies and are
getting on board to fix the problem.44
Gambling through non-regulated bookies is the primary source of the
problem. The match does not have to be fixed by the corruption of
participants. There are interim points in many sports where betting may occur,
for example, on the outcome of one set in the tennis match, or tie breakers or
deuce games, or who will obtain the first corner kick or yellow card in a
soccer match. Of course, some sports lend themselves to this type of gambling
because there are well-recognized interim points that can be bet upon.45
Another aspect of the gambling challenge to sport arises from the match-fixing
or point-shaving activities of corrupt players. Such conduct changes the risk
profile in favor of the corrupting bookie and enables both athlete and bookie to
prosper from their corrupt activity.
VII. MATCH FIXING AS CORRUPTION
Several sports have reports of gambling and match fixing by athletes, team
officials, and referees and have legal decisions associated with such matters.
In professional tennis, there have been several investigations into the conduct
of players, usually prompted by suspicious wagers or unusually large amounts
of betting on games.46 In 2007, there was a media firestorm surrounding
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See European Sports Security Association Hompage, ESSA, http://www.eu-ssa.org (last
visited Mar. 11, 2011); see also 9th Annual iGaming Conference and Expo, EIGEXPO.COM,
http://www.eigexpo.com/essab (last visited Mar. 11, 2011).
46. For instance, there has been an investigation launched into a July 2010 tennis match between
Richard Bloomfield and Christophe Rochus. Bloomfield won in straight sets, even though he was
ranked No. 552 in the world and Rochus was ranked No. 160. Bloomfield became the 1-8 favorite
shortly after capturing the first set. When more than 1£ million were bet on this low priority, low
exposure game, suspicions were aroused, and the investigation was launched. Betting Investigation
into Briton Richard Bloomfield’s Clash with Christophe Rochus, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (London),
July 9, 2010, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/tennis/atptour/7880995/Bettinginvestigation-into-Briton-Richard-Bloomfields-clash-with-Christophe-Rochus.html.
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Russian tennis player Nikolay Davydenko.47 There was an abnormally large
amount of money, roughly $7 million USD, bet on a match between fourthranked Davydenko and eighty-seventh-ranked Martin Vassallo Arguello.48
Davydenko retired from the match, which Arguello was leading, as a result of
an aggravated left foot injury.49 Following more than a year of investigation,
Davydenko and Arguello were cleared of match-fixing,50 but stories of matchfixing and gambling issues in tennis became widespread.
Other tennis players have reported incidents where they have been
approached and offered financial compensation to participate in corrupt
practices. Gilles Elseneer and Dmitry Tursunov both claim to have
encountered such unwanted approaches with bribe offers to match-fix.
Neither took part in any corrupt activity, and both reported the issue to the
necessary authorities. In professional tennis, part of the rulebook deals with
the obligations of players concerning gambling matters. There are some
measures in place to forbid interaction between professional athletes and
known gambling professionals. For example, a man who identified himself as
a professional gambler approached Russian player Ekaterina Bychkova
through her blog and offered financial compensation for her participation in a
match-fixing scheme. Bychkova rejected his offer and ceased communication;
however, she failed to report the incident, an offense under the Uniform
Tennis Anti-Corruption Program.51 Penalties under this program are fines up
to $250,000 and lifetime bans. Bychkova was fined $5,000, and a thirty-day
suspension was imposed on her in a decision of the Anti-Corruption Hearing
Officer.52 Later that same year, Daniel Koellerer, an Austrian pro tennis
player, was given a fine of 15,000 € and a three-month suspension (both
sanctions were suspended for two years on the condition of no further
infraction of the rulebook) for having betting odds on tennis matches on his

47. Davydenko Cleared of Match-Fixing, BBC SPORT, Sept. 12, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
sport2/hi/tennis/7612536.stm.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Bychkova v Prof’l. Integrity Officers, a decision under the Uniform Anti-Corruption
Program of professional tennis dated January 8, 2010. Press Release, Tennis Integrity Unity,
Decision in the Case of Ekaterina Bychkova (Jan. 8, 2010) available at http://www.sonyericsson
wtatour.com/SEWTATourArchive/Archive/PressReleases/2010/01_08_Bychkova_Decision.pdf.
52. Press Release, Tennis Integrity Unit, supra note 51. Still, it is not illegal for tennis players to
associate with suspicious individuals. Yevgeny Kafelnikov, Marat Safin, and Andrei Medvedev were
photographed with Alimzhan Tokhtakhounov, a suspected mobster from the Soviet republic of
Uzbekistan. Richard H. McLaren, Corruption: Its Impact on Fair Play, 19 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV.
15, 18 (2008).
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personal website.53 The player and his manager admitted to the offenses, and
the manager was given a twelve-month suspension of credentials and access to
any event with a similar two-year suspended sanctions.54
For some athletes, the financial compensation that can accompany
participation in corrupt gambling in their sport is too much to refuse because
the earnings of many professional athletes, outside of the marquee players, are
small in comparison to the large first and second place finishers‟ purses.
Several tennis players have been suspended or sanctioned for betting generally
in their own sport and otherwise on the Internet. Although no professional
tennis player has been sanctioned or accused of betting on the tennis player‟s
own matches, players have been sanctioned for betting on professional tennis.
Alessio Di Mauro was the first player to be sanctioned for betting, having
made 120 bets with an online bookmaker involving approximately 340 ATP
matches, as well as bets on football games.55 Di Mauro claimed to have never
placed bets on a tennis match in which he competed.56 In an effort to
encourage confessions and participation in anti-corruption initiatives, CAS
reduced the first instance sanction of $60,000 USD and a nine-month
suspension to seven months and $25,000 USD.57 There are further examples
of professional tennis players who have been sanctioned for gambling
infractions.58

53. Koellerer Disciplined by Tennis Integrity Unit, ITFTENNIS.COM, Aug. 19, 2010,
http://www.itftennis.com/abouttheitf/news/newsarticle.asp?articleid=21609.
54. Id.
55. Di Mauro / ATP Tour Inc. CAS 2007/A/1427, at 2.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 9.
58. Potito Starace made five bets on professional tennis totaling $130 USD, while Daniele
Bracciali made approximately fifty bets, each of $7 USD. Neither player bet on matches that they
participated in; Starace was suspended for six weeks and fined $30,000 USD, while Bracciali was
banned for three months and fined $20,000 USD. Players Bet on Tennis, But Not Their Own
Matches, ESPN.COM, Dec. 27, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/sports/tennis/news/story?id=3165719.
Giorgio Galimberti bet on tennis matches 401 times on 1796 matches. William Weinbaum, ATP:
Galimerti Bets Included Wagers on Own Matches, ESPN.COM, Feb. 19, 2008,
http://sports.espn.go.com/sports/tennis/news/story?id=3253331.
Frantisek Cermak and Michal Mertinak were also sanctioned for betting on professional
matches that were not their own. Both players received suspensions and fines for their infractions.
ATP Suspends Doubles Titlists Cermak, Mertinak for Betting, ESPN.COM, July 21, 2008,
http://sports.espn.go.com/sports/tennis/news/story?id=3498511. Moreover, Mathieu Montcourt was
suspended for eight weeks and fined $ 12,000 USD after the ATP determined he bet on matches.
Montcourt Suspended 2 Months, Fined $12K for Betting on Matches, ESPN.COM, Aug. 8, 2008,
http://sports.espn.go.com/sports/tennis/news/story?id=3525837; see also Montcourt v. Ass’n of Tennis
Prof’ls, CAS 2008/A/1630. Finally, Federico Luzzi bet 273 times on 836 matches; however, Luzzi
was determined to have bet on one of his own matches. Luzzi placed one €3 bet on himself to win,
but the ATP found no evidence of any attempt by Luzzi to affect the outcome of any tennis match.

MCLAREN (DO NOT DELETE)

566

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

7/15/2011 10:22 AM

[Vol. 21:2

Whether it is a coach, manager, official, or referee, participants other than
players can greatly affect the outcome of a sporting competition. Tim
Donaghy, a former National Basketball Association (NBA) referee, was
caught making picks on sixteen games he officiated during the 2006–07
season following an investigation conducted by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. Donaghy bet on thirty to forty games that he officiated in each
of the three prior seasons and had disclosed information regarding player
injuries and which referees were assigned to specific games to people betting
on NBA games.59 He was eventually sentenced to a prison term of fifteen
months and ordered to pay $217,266 USD in restitution for conspiracy to
commit wire fraud by denying his employer the intangible right to his honest
services and conspiracy to transmit wagering information.60
Donaghy‟s conduct as an NBA official has had and will continue to have
lingering effects. There are rampant stories about corruption in the NBA, and
Donaghy has furthered this speculation with his own allegations about
rampant gambling by referees and other individuals, including league
executives, general managers, referees, and players. The NBA has a history of
gambling controversies,61 and as a result, the league has strict rules that
prohibit gambling. Donaghy has described various examples of improper
interactions and relationships between referees and other league officials,
“claiming league officials would tell referees that they should withhold calling
technical fouls on . . . star players because doing so [could] hurt ticket sales
and television ratings.”62 Donaghy has been linked to organized crime, and
his actions have served to demonstrate the further erosion of integrity in
sport.63
The sport of soccer has had a number of issues surrounding match-fixing,
and there is an ongoing investigation that started in 2010, wherein “at least
250 football matches in nine countries are suspected of manipulation.”64 The
Luzzi Fined $50,000, Suspended 200 Days, ESPN.COM, Feb. 29, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/
sports/tennis/news/story?id+3271281; see also file at CAS 2008/A/1529.
59. LAWRENCE B. PEDOWITZ, REPORT TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE NATIONAL
BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION (2008), available at http://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/_
documents/100208nba_pedowitz.pdf.
60. See United States v. Donaghy, 570 F. Supp 2d 411 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
61. See e.g., Ira Berkow, The Temptations of a Man of Integrity, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1992, at
S9.
62. Letter from Atty. John F. Lauro, to Honorable Carol Bagley Amon (June 10, 2008) (Re:
United States v. Timothy Donaghy) available at http://assets.espn.go.com/media/pdf/080610/
donaghy03.pdf.
63. Similar assertions have been made against the UEFA and FIFA organizers of football. See
HILL, supra note 31.
64. Nicolas Bonassi, Updates on Sports Law, INSIGHT: SPORTS LAW NEWSLETTER (Lenz &
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CAS rendered its first ever award in a match-fixing case arising out of an
investigation by Union of European Football Associations (UEFA).65 In that
case, the football club Pobeda was banned for eight years from UEFA
competitions, and the president of that club was banned for life from any
football related activities for his part in a match-fixing affair, which came to
light after a UEFA investigation brought on by notice of unusual betting
patterns.
How athletes become involved in corruption is a topic of concern for those
trying to preserve the integrity of a sport. The corruption that was unearthed
in international cricket is a perfect example of the timeline of a match-fixing
scheme because it shows how a corrupt scheme can be hatched and also
demonstrates how deeply gambling may affect a sport. In 1996, Mohammad
Azharuddin, former captain of the Indian national cricket team, introduced
Hansie Conje to Indian bookmaker Mukesh Gupta. During a test in Kanpur in
1996, Gupta asked Cronje to persuade his team to throw the match. Cronje
says he spoke to no one and received money for doing nothing. In the
infamous Centurion Test against England in 2000, he received £5,000 and a
leather jacket for contriving a win for Nasser Hussain‟s tourists when a
weather-affected draw looked certain. Cronje then asked two teammates to
underperform in a one-day international at Nagpur.66 These players later
received six-month bans, despite never receiving money for their participation.
Cronje was given a lifetime ban from the sport; he challenged this, but it was
dismissed.67 Cronje‟s actions were based upon bribes he received from
bookkeepers looking to increase their chances at big gambling wins. More
recently, a match between Pakistan and England, played August 29, 2010, is
being investigated as a result of suspicions of corruption. Scotland Yard
police have questioned two players over allegations that they accepted money
from gamblers to deliberately bowl (throw) no-balls at certain points during
the match. News of the World secretly filmed undercover reporters,68 posing
as front men for an East Asian gambling cartel, in discussion with a man it
identified as London-based businessman Mazhar Majeed. Majeed appears to

Staehelein, Geneva Switz.), Nov. 2010, at 9.
65. FK Probeda et al / UEFA CAS 2009/A/1920.
66. Peter Robinson, Cronje Remains an Outcast, ESPN CRICINFO, Oct. 17, 2001,
http://www.cricinfo.com/ci/content/story/109086.html.
67. Id.
68. In an article in the Daily Telegraph, the ICC is reported it was considering using its own
undercover agents to approach players. See International Cricket Council Could Use Undercover
Agents to Fight Corruption in Sport, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Oct. 19, 2007, available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/cricket/news/8074370/International-Cricket-Council-could-useundercover-agents-to-fight-corruption-in-the-sport.html.
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accept £150,000 ($244,600 USD) to make sure no-balls are bowled at certain
times during the match. Majeed was arrested as authorities began to
investigate the claims after players Mohammad Asif and Mohammad Amir
appeared to overstep the line from which they must bowl behind exactly when
Majeed said they would.69 Asif and Amir, along with test skipper Salman
Butt, have been provisionally suspended and have appealed their bans; at the
time of writing, the case was under adjudication.
Such incidents, and many more that could be cited, do suggest that sport
and its integrity are under threat from illegal bookmaking. A number of
responsible IFs, such as the International Cricket Council (ICC), the
International Federation of Football Assocation (FIFA), the International
Olympic Committee (IOC), and the ITF, are not sitting idly by and have
created integrity units to deal with the attack to their sport coming from
corrupt book makers. The incidents suggest the need for regulation both by
Ifs, games organizers, and possibly governments taking the matter away from
the private world of sports federations and moving it into the public domain of
law enforcement. We need to turn now to the private sport standard forum for
imposition of discipline upon members and the arbitration and dispute
resolution mechanisms to impose the disciplinary sanctions on members.
VIII. THE PRIVATE ARBITRATION SYSTEM
A. Analytical Cases: Landis
Blood and urine tests are used to determine whether or not an athlete is
doping. The ability to perform these tests is the most powerful tool that
sporting administrators have to protect sports from corruption. The authority
to test athletes is in the WADA Code, and IFs have incorporated these rules
into their anti-doping policies. Still, abnormal findings in these tests can lead
to lengthy and expensive adjudication, which the current sports arbitration
system has trouble paying for. An example of this is the case of American
cyclist Floyd Landis, which was an extensive review of the laboratory testing
system used by the Laboratoire National de Dépistage du Dopage (LNDD) and
the alleged mistakes that were made throughout the testing process. The
review was intended to establish the incompetency of the French laboratory
and besmirch, if not destroy, the international drug testing system. These
claims culminated in a two-day discovery process that discussed outstanding
issues surrounding discovery and the production of LNDD‟s documentation.
The issues included additional testing of Landis‟s sample, reprocessing of

69. It’s Just Not Cricket, supra note 2.
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data, and appointing a scientific expert who would supervise the extraction of
the electronic data files for use in rerunning the results.70 At the first instance
level of this case, Landis requested massive amounts of documentation and
testing. For this analytical case, the issues regarding the laboratory were the
focus. The cost of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) hearing and
the subsequent CAS appeal was enormous for both Landis, who required
donations to afford the case, and the arbitration system. The arbitration
system is not set up to handle cases of this magnitude. With the advancement
of technology and the complex testing mechanisms necessary to determine
whether or not an infraction has been committed, these hearings are heading
away from simple analytical cases to cases that scrutinize every detail at an
unaffordable cost.
B. Non-Analytical Cases: Valverde
If the investigation does not result from a positive analytical finding from
a sample given in accordance with a sporting federation testing procedure,
adjudication can be difficult, as the authority to test does not exist beyond the
in- or out-of-competition rules. Therefore, athletes can refuse to provide a
blood sample during cases against them. This lack of authority made for a
complicated case when Spanish cyclist Alejandro Valverde was accused of
doping.71 As part of the evidence in a Spanish criminal investigation, a blood
bag was suspected of being that of Valverde. The International Cycling Union
(UCI) requested that the Spanish Cycling Federation (RFEC) commence
proceedings against Valverde based on the blood bag obtained as evidence by
the Spanish authorities. After the RFEC did not take action against him,
WADA and UCI filed an appeal with CAS requesting a doping violation be
found.
Other than the evidence regarding Valverde‟s connection to Dr. Fuentes
and evidence related to other documentary materials seized during the Spanish
investigation, UCI and WADA had no scientific evidence as to whom the
blood bag belonged or that Valverde was using prohibited substances. The
evidence that finally won the day was obtained by the Italian authorities in
Valverde I, which launched an investigation under Italian law that permitted
Spanish authorities to do what UCI and WADA could not do: obtain a sample
portion of the blood held by the Spanish authorities. Provided with that blood
sample and urine specimens from prior racing in Italy, the Italian authorities
70. See United States Anti-Doping Agency v. Landis, Case No. 30 190 00847 06 (Sept. 20,
2007), available at http://www.usantidoping.org/files/active/arbitration_rulings/landis%20final%
20%2820-09-07%29%20%283%29.pdf.
71. See Royal Spanish Cycling Fed. / Int’l Cycling Union, CAS 2007/O/1381.
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were able to match the DNA of the two specimens: urine in Italy and blood
from Spain. This rather conclusive evidence, along with other actual witness
evidence and documentation that had originally flowed out of Spain to the
UCI and was made available in Italy, resulted in an Italian criminal
investigation and adjudication. Valverde was suspended for two years from
competing in Italian events. He appealed that decision to CAS, and it resulted
in the first CAS case (referred to herein as Valverde I) involving sanctions for
a doping infraction under the jurisdiction of the Italian law on doping.72
Valverde II73 then proceeded to a hearing following Valverde I, and based
upon the evidence in Valverde I admitted as part of the proceedings in
Valverde II, such as the evidence concerning the blood bag containing a
prohibited substance and DNA evidence, together with the other evidence
from Valverde I and Valverde II, the Panel concluded that Valverde had
committed a non-analytical doping violation under the UCI and WADA
relevant doping control rules.74 Valverde II applied a sanction retroactive to
the commencement of the Italian sanction and confirmed the two-year
suspension.75 It should be noted that both CAS decisions have been appealed
to the Swiss Federal Tribunal on various grounds and, at the time of writing,
the results of those appeals were unknown.
The use of the evidence from the Spanish administrative law and Italian
criminal proceedings raised international law issues, such as the applicability
of a national court order to an international arbitration proceeding, as well as
the process by which parties and a subsequent arbitration panel could be
constrained on the basis of res judicata. Without the evidence of the blood
bag from the Spanish proceedings and the ability to test for DNA against the
sample collected in Italy, the legal conclusion of the case would have likely
been less certain.
What Valverde I and Valverde II illustrate is that, at least in non-analytical
positive doping cases, private associations, such as the UCI and WADA, are
without authority to subpoena or compel the gathering of the necessary
evidence. They also lack either a protocol or a legal framework within which
to request the cooperation of public authorities to provide the information and
evidence necessary to satisfy the private arbitration process that a doping
infraction ought to be declared. The related problem to that of the public
authorities holding necessary evidence is the attempt to obtain the cooperation
of an athlete in exchange for a reduced sanction. In those situations, the
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
See generally WADA & UCI / Valverde & RFEC, CAS 2007/A/1396 & 1402.
Id. ¶ 17.1.
Id. ¶ 19.12.
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private sports organization cannot offer the criminal immunity in exchange for
the cooperation. Thus, if Valverde had offered to cooperate with Italian
authorities, he could have received such immunity if the authorities were
satisfied with the cooperation. In countries where the doping infraction is
pursued separately from the private arbitration process, the private sports body
cannot assist the athlete in his cooperation by promising public authority
immunity to prosecution. The moving of at least some non-analytical doping
cases involving evidence gathered by public authorities or seeking the cooperation of the athlete in an investigation may well have to be moved out of
the private arbitration process and into the public sector for prosecution in
order to allow for successful pursuit of the infraction. In the future, it may be
the only manner in which the compelling evidence that the private system
cannot demand can be appropriately reviewed and evaluated to determine a
doping infraction. Thus, without the cooperation of Italian authorities and the
Spanish authority‟s ability to seize evidence, WADA and UCI would not have
had the case they ultimately were able to make out.
IX. ADJUDICATING GAMBLING CASES
A similar limitation on the private adjudication process shows up in
reviewing the jurisprudence to date on the gambling cases. In those cases
without an admission on the part of the athlete, the evidence will be too
circumstantial to achieve an infraction by adjudication. The public authorities‟
power to gather evidence is required in the non-admission type of case before
the arbitration model will be effective. There is also the further fact that, at the
moment, there is no international agency like WADA overseeing and bridging
the gap between the individual federations and the overall interests of the
sporting community and contributing to the process where private associations
do not want to go. WADA contributes to the harmonization and the regulation
and adjudication of doping infractions, but there is no parallel organization for
gambling. The organizations and integrity units that exist within some
countries‟ sporting agencies and IFs are not doing their job effectively or as
completely as is required. Although they purport to be doing a vigilant and
necessary job, they may be doing a lackadaisical job on purpose in a
misguided desire to protect their brand and sport from the perils of corruption.
As noted by Declan Hill, there are many motivations for sporting
organizations to avoid bringing this corruption to light.76 The publicity that is
associated with corruption is financially detrimental to the sport‟s sponsors.
Hill recounts a comment from a police officer who was involved with an

76. Hill, supra note 31, at 187.
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investigation into actions by former Liverpool FC goalie Bruce Grobbelaar,
“„At first, they wanted to help. But as the trial started, the football world
banded together and would not help us at all. They wanted the bad publicity
to go away.‟”77 Often, the integrity units may do the opposite of their
intended purpose and make the investigation more difficult for police rather
than help them, but they cannot pursue their own private eradication of
corruption without the cooperation of the public authorities.
The IOC recently held a seminar in Lausanne, “Sports Betting: A
Challenge to be Faced.” The recommendations called for all constituents of
the Olympic movement to adopt internal legislation aimed at corrupt gambling
activity and to endorse a disciplinary procedure for breaches of these rules and
the implementation of communication, education, and prevention programs by
all constituents of the Olympic movements.78 This is similar to the early,
halting steps engaged in by the IOC in the doping world. History is now
repeating itself in the emerging parallel corruption and threat to the integrity of
sport represented by the problems raised by illicit gambling in sport. The IOC
also recommended that sporting agencies develop partnerships and collaborate
with regional, provincial, and national authorities.79 The logical step in
furtherance of those recommendations is an IF similar to WADA dealing with
the threat to the integrity of sport through gambling.
X. CONCLUSION
Corruption through gambling and PEDs is challenging the fundamental
underpinnings of sporting integrity. The sports fraudster is wrongfully
benefitting from this dishonesty, be it through the use of prohibited substances,
match-fixing, or other forms of gambling in sport. The will to affect change
by vigorous pursuit of these insidious forces does not seem to be present in
many sports administrators for fear of damaging the brand or image of their
sport. Financial exigencies are also causing the adjudication system in sport to
bump up against the limits of the ability of dispute resolution to provide a
forum for the resolution of these disputes. Furthermore, in many instances, the
information gathered in the course of investigations, which may or may not be
pursued by government authorities, is vital to the successful prosecution by
private adjudicator of corruption matters. The result is going to have to be
more governmental assistance and better cooperation between sports
administrators and the various governmental agencies that can help them out.
77. Id. at 187.
78. Recommendations for the IOC Seminar: Sports Betting: A Challenge to be Faced,
EUROOLYMPIC.ORG, June 24, 2010, http://www.euoffice.eurolympic.org/cms/getfile.php?113.
79. Id.
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In the area of gambling corruption, the IFs are in immediate need of an
international collaborative effort similar in form to that of WADA. If these
matters do not change in the near future, sport will indeed lose its integrity.

